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CPYRGHT

U. S. Spy Network Inside Germany Speeds War's End

Successful Spy Must Have
10 Special Traits in Makeup

CPYRGHT
By LADISLÁS FARAGO

Last of a series of six installments from Mr. Farago's book, **WAR OF WITS**, just published by Funk & Wagnalls. Mr. Farago is a former chief of U. S. Naval Intelligence.

CHAPTER SIX

It is virtually impossible to set up a network of spies in an enemy country during wartime. It has to be done before the outbreak of hostilities.

Even the Russians failed to re-establish one within Germany when their original network, known as the "Red Orchestra," was smashed.

They created such networks only in the countries of their wartime allies, Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States and in neutral Switzerland.

But where the Russians failed the United States succeeded, largely because of the exceptional skill, ingenuity, and tenacity of the American intelligence genius, Allen W. Dulles, now the head of America's Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Dulles arrived in Berne, capital of Switzerland, in the fall of 1942, a few months after the establishment of the Office of Strategic Services. He was to set up a Swiss branch of the OSS for the purpose of procuring information about neighboring Germany.

In a brownstone house in Berne's quiet Herren Street, Dulles devised a new operation to which the whole underworld of espionage was soon beating a path.

"My first and most important task," Mr. Dulles later recalled, "was to find out what was going on in Germany. Among other things, Washington wanted to know who in Germany were really op-

posed to overthrow it. As far as the outside world could see, it often seemed as though Hitler had succeeded in winning over, hypnotizing, or terrorizing the entire German nation.

"From Switzerland I was able to establish contact with the German underground and for many months before the culmination of the plot on July 20 I had kept in touch with those who were conspiring to rid Germany of the Nazis and the Nazi state. Couriers, risking their lives, went back and forth between Switzerland and Germany with reports...."

The network Mr. Dulles succeeded in establishing within Germany was large in numbers and exceptionally high in quality. In all the history of espionage there had been no precedent for this achievement.

While this type of network usually is intended to procure tactical information of a special or local nature, the high quality of the Dulles system produced at least one result of the greatest significance.

Through this network Mr. Dulles managed to start a conspiracy within the high command of the German armies in the south that brought about the surrender of the very army on which Hitler was dependent for the prolonging of the war from behind the legendary "Alpine Redoubt."

Different countries have different ideas of "the perfect spy."

In the United States the spy is popularly thought of as an easy-going rugged individualist, not necessarily brilliant in all fields, but a wizard at his own specialty. He is ingenious, instinctive, and intuitive, with little liking for pure reason, adventurous and brave, adaptable, friendly a quick improviser in tight situations, some-

In actual fact, successful spies possess all of these traits to some degree.

Several scientific efforts were made, especially in the United States, to establish the personality structure of the ideal spy. On the basis of these studies, there was drawn up a catalogue of ten major groups of traits which the good spy is supposed to possess in order to qualify.

First of all, his morale must be high and he must be genuinely interested in the job ahead.

Second, he must be energetic, zealous, and enterprising.

Third, he must be resourceful, a quick and practical thinker. He must have good judgment and know how to deal with things, people, and ideas. He must be proficient in some occupational skill.

Fourth, he must be emotionally stable, capable of great endurance under stress. He must be calm and quiet, tolerant and healthy.

Fifth, he must have the ability to get along with other people, to work as a member of a team, to understand the foibles of others while being reasonably free of the same foibles himself.

Sixth, he must know how to inspire collaboration, to organize, administer, and lead others. He must be willing to accept responsibility.

Seventh, he must be discreet, have a passion for anonymity, and know how to keep his mouth shut and preserve a secret.

Eighth, he must be able to bluff and mislead, but only when bluffing and misleading become necessary.

Ninth, he must be agile, rugged, and daring.

Tenth, he must have the ability to observe everything, to memorize details accurately. He must be able to report on his observations lucidly, to evaluate his observations and relate them to the greater complex of things.

It is the rare individual who combines all of these traits in his personality. Men who were highly intelligent were found to be strong in leadership, excellent observers and reporters, and good salesmen.

But their emotional stability was often low, their discretion left something to be desired, their sociability was deficient, and they generally lacked a physical skill.

Emotionally stable persons were found to be sociable and good lead-

ers, discreet and fairly skilled but their intelligence was somewhat lower. They were also poor observers, inaccurate reporters and not good salesmen.

It was found that the ideal spy was not so often the brilliant spy but the average spy. This "averageness" included even his personal appearance.

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End of Series